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From Senior Official to Top Civil
Servant
An Enquiry into the Shanghai Party School1
Emilie Tran
EDITOR'S NOTE
Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
1 The months, even more the weeks leading up to the Sixteenth Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), in the course of which were to be unveiled the names of the
new  leadership  team,  were  a  period  that  has  very  naturally  come  to  be  called
“Pekinology”. This exercise,  useful though it  may be,  is  risky. Because mistakes are
never forgiven and because they are nevertheless frequent, the wealth of information
required for this type of guesswork is quickly discredited. Andrew Nathan and Bruce
Gilley, the “authors” of China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files,  a work largely based on a
book published in Chinese 2, have experienced this cruel reality for themselves. From
the very first page, despite the brash promise of the title, the reader has to correct the
stated composition of the Standing Committee of the Politburo—nine instead of seven
members and Li Ruihuan’s demise 3—and ignore the prediction that Jiang Zemin would
by now have retired completely from the political  scene.  Even so,  the little  esteem
attaching to this kind of writing is a somewhat unjust, and we readily acknowledge that
Pekinology,  when  the  art  is  thoroughly  mastered,  is  undeniably  one  of  the  best
approaches to an understanding of the political elite and the politics of the elite 4.
2 One can also sound out the leadership from the outside, by seeking to understand its
relationship  with  the  new  society  that  has  been  created  by  the  reforms  and,  in
particular, its relations with the upper levels of that society. But one quickly realises
that the two worlds are far from separate, their boundaries being blurred by a complex
network of relationships. Individual rights still lag behind the evolution of the state;
and the political system is developing even while it continues to dominate society. The
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leadership’s sphere of activity is shrinking and becoming more specialised in order to
respond to new tasks: thus the state broadens its mission and preserves its legitimacy.
This inner evolution refocuses our analysis upon the spheres of power and invites us to
approach the question of the political elite from quite another angle than that of the
capital city and Zhongnanhai. The new (first) approach is different but nevertheless
complementary to the old (second). In moving to the local level, we shall find that the
Party schools are an excellent field for the study of these developments.
3 The  shared  study  that  we  carried  out  within  the  school  of  the  CCP  Committee  in
Shanghai  (Zhonggong  Shanghai  shiwei  dangxiao)  5 reveals  that  it  has  undergone
significant changes due to the policy of reform and openness. The school was founded
during the summer of 1949, just after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had seized
control of the city. It was the first of its kind and was assigned the difficult task of
training the administrative staff of the new municipal government. Today, thanks to
numerous measures taken by leaders at local and national level, the Shanghai Party
School is  fulfilling its  purpose better  than ever,  judging by the number of  officials
attending the establishment and the content of the courses it offers—so much so that it
has more in common with a public administration institute than a Party school.
4 If Party officials are being transformed into professional executives, does this mean the
end of their political status? Are we on the way to seeing the Communist Party official
becoming just a senior civil servant?
 
The campus: a paradise for Party officials
5 In 1979, China was starting out on the path to openness and economic reform. In view
of the ensuing changes, the CCP’s local committee in Shanghai had quickly understood
that in order to manage and direct the Party officials they would need to be retrained.
And even though, during the following decade, the city authorities were kept apart
from the reform process, they were keen to inaugurate in their own way this new era.
They  decided,  as  early  as  1983,  that  the  Party  school  should be  moved  to  a more
suitable campus, one that was modern and above all more spacious 6. The aim was not
just to provide future officials with better training in the reforms but also to bring
many  more  of  them  to  Shanghai.  Accordingly,  new  premises  had  to  be  built.  The
project approved by the Shanghai Communist Party in December 1983 specified that
the new school and its campus should be constructed on a 200 mu site—that is, more
than  13  hectares—and  that  they  should  accommodate  1,500  trainees  7.  The  overall
budget allocated to this enterprise was to rise to 37 million yuan 8. The work was begun
the  following  year  and  completed  in  August  1987.  The  school  moved  into  its  new
premises in July 1989.
 
Marx, Engels and… PowerPoint: a place for study
6 The new Party school was based at Number 200, South Hongcao Street (Hongcao nan lu),
a stone’s throw from the Shanghai Teacher Training College (Shanghai shifan daxue), on
the south-western corner of the city,  far from the centre and from the fashionable
districts. It stands out against the urban landscape of this middle-class residential area.
7 The low wall surrounding the school campus and the two PLA guards posted one on
each side of the entrance are there to mark the physical and symbolic divide between
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the school and the outside world: these are the chosen ones of the People’s Party. For
all that, this is no forbidden city of the communist age: looking from the street one can
see the campus through the large entrance gates; its modern buildings rise well above
the surrounding wall. Thus, the first image one has of the school is of a place intended
to  look  open  and  modern,  an  impression  confirmed  as  one  goes  through  into  the
campus.
8 The entrance gates open onto a large flowerbed in the middle of which rise majestically
the giant statues of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. By contrast, Mao Zedong and Deng
Xiaoping are nowhere to be seen, whether in sculpture or in paintings. Nevertheless,
when the trainees arrived back from their  holidays in September 2001(for the new
term),  they found their  school  decorated with giant  red banners  referring to  Jiang
Zemin, on which they could read: xuexi Jiang zong shuji « qi yi » jianghua (Study the July
1st speech of Secretary General Jiangt) and guanche « san ge daibiao » zhongyao sixiang
(Apply the important ideas of the “three representations”)
 
A splendid library
9 Behind the founding fathers of communism stands the imposing library, whose façade,
all  glass  and  steel,  reflects  the  latest  architectural  trends  and  thus  proclaims  the
school’s will to look modern. The library’s books consist mainly of works relating to
human  and  social  sciences,  among  them  the  indispensable  collections  of  Marxist
philosophy, the history of the Party, Mao’s thoughts and the theories of Deng. But the
latter  are there more for  decoration than to be consulted.  Also for  decoration,  the
floors, walls and even the lifts are clad in marble. To these “off-putting” books, as the
trainee officials say themselves, they vastly prefer the periodicals hall where one can
find practically all the daily papers, as well as several reviews and magazines published
in China and which Party cadres do not always find within reach or which they no
longer find time to read. Of the library’s eight reading halls, it is the periodicals hall
that is most frequented. What draws so many students to it is the opportunity offered
by  their  time  at  the  school  to  read  and  inform  themselves  about  China  and  the
contemporary world, but also to refresh their minds after classes or merely to kill time
—time that some of them eventually find rather long. In addition to the publications of
the People’s Republic, one can also find some newspapers and magazines from Hong
Kong—Wenhuibao and  Jingji  ribao ( Economic  Daily)—from  Macao—Aomen  ribao  (Macao
Daily  News)—and  even  from  Taiwan—Lianhebao  (United  Daily  News),  Zhongguo  shibao
(China Times) and Zhongyang ribao (Central Daily News).
10 Opposite the periodicals hall is one devoted to neibu documents (those restricted to
internal  circulation),  where  the  trainee  officials  may  go  only  after  producing
documentary  evidence  of  their  grade.  In  principle,  the  great  majority  of  them are
entitled to access. However, if one compares the few who consult the documents with
the  many  who  read  the  newspapers,  one  swiftly  concludes  that  these  famous
documents,  despite  their  confidential  nature,  do  not  arouse  any particular  interest
among the trainees. When asked about this, their reply is beyond appeal: “It doesn’t
interest us!” Indeed, within their danwei, they have already acquainted themselves with
the neibu documents relating to their administrative work. Moreover, documents that
might have interested them are not to be found here or may be consulted only by a
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rather small minority of the students—and these never read them because they already
know the “secrets” they contain.
11 Adjacent to the neibu documents hall is a room reserved for foreign periodicals: one
must pass through the former to gain access to the latter. It  goes to show that the
contents  of  foreign  publications  are  even more  confidential  than  that  of  the  neibu
documents… Set out  on the display  stands  are  a  review in  Russian and another  in
Japanese as well as several daily papers and reviews in English: South China Morning Post,
International  Herald  Tribune,  Far  Eastern  Economic  Review,  Time,  and  even  The China
Quarterly. But this room is even less busy than the neibu documents hall, quite simply
because few of the trainee officials master another language sufficiently well to tackle
one these periodicals.
12 The other hall  attracting as many, or even more,  of  the trainees is  the multimedia
centre where the fifteen or so computers are invaded whenever there are no classes.
Indeed, each trainee is allocated a limited number of hours for surfing the Internet
during his or her course, the quota being determined according to grade and length of
course. This is how the trainees, in common with a good number of their compatriots,
learned about the events of September 11th 2001 even before the Chinese media had
broadcast the news. This multimedia facility has another function, its primary purpose:
it is there to transmit, via the internal party schools network, certain video conference
classes from the Party’s Central School in Peking. Needless to say, it is not to listen to
these classes—not even those given by leading figures in the prestigious Peking School
—that the trainees in Shanghai flock to the computers. Most use them to check their e-
mails or to surf the Web, generally seeking out news sites.
 
Ultra-modern classrooms
13 While  they are  not  obliged to  take  any interest  in  lectures  from the Central  Party
School, trainees do have a duty to attend those laid on by the Shanghai School to show
that they have completed their courses. Classes are held in the same building, located
to the right of the main entrance on the north-eastern side of the campus. Like the
library, this building too is a paragon of modern architecture. Three storeys high and
constructed as a rotunda, it is spacious, airy and well-lit thanks to a roof with glass
openings allowing free ingress to the daylight, which is then reflected off white walls
and  marble.  An  electronic  indicator  board,  hanging  in  the  entrance-hall,  scrolls
through the different years showing, for each one, the room number for the next class.
The classrooms are in keeping with the building: they are white and functional, with no
decoration at all, not so much as a picture of Marx, or Mao, or even calligraphic designs
—which is surprising in such a place, to say the least. On the other hand, every single
classroom  is  equipped  with  Microsoft  PowerPoint,  enabling  teachers  to  give
multimedia presentations during their classes. The lecturers at the school comply with
this practice having been trained to do so, but some are less proficient than others.
Indeed, delivering one’s classes with the aid of PowerPoint presentations seems to have
become the defining mark of up-to-date teaching. A little electronic jingle announces
the beginning and the end of each session.  The only false note in this ensemble of
antiseptic modernity intrudes during breaks between classes: for fifteen minutes on
end, loudspeakers bellow the revolutionary songs of another age, their words clashing
as discordantly with the décor as with the content of the lectures…
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Table1: Courses at the Shanghai Party scholl, 1949-1965
Source: Figures compiled based on Zhonggong Shanghai shiwei dangxiao zhi, Shanghai jiaoyu
chubanshe, Shanghai, 1999.
 
Three-star hotel with swimming pool: a place to relax in
14 Full-time trainees, that is to say, those who have classes from Monday morning until
Friday  lunchtime,  are  supposed  to  stay  on  campus  throughout  the  week  and  are
allowed  home  only  at  the  weekend.  They  live  on  campus,  which  for  that  purpose
includes a restaurant-cafeteria that serves up three meals a day, quite varied and tasty
food, just like a three-star hotel, built and managed by the Jinjiang group of Shanghai. 
The sleeping quarters are modern and comfortable, but a little bland; the 450 rooms
comprise 100 singles and 350 doubles, providing accommodation for up to 800 trainees,
generally  sleeping two to  a  room.  Even if  the  young officials  object  to  this  lack of
privacy, they readily acknowledge that having to share a room with a fellow-student in
their year enables them to make connections that could ultimately be useful. Building
up a network of contacts is, in most trainees’ eyes, the most important aspect of their
time at the school. They consider, in effect, that acquiring a rich network of guanxi is
more  useful  to  their  professional  career  than  anything  they  might  learn  in  the
classroom. According to one former trainee, the wish—secret—of each trainee, when
sent on a training course at the school, is to be part of a year of officials that might turn
out  useful  to  know…  This  trainee’s  wish  was  fulfilled  beyond  all  expectations,  his
former roommate being now Chief of Police in Shanghai 9!
15 The  other  buildings  on  the  campus—administration  offices,  former  classrooms,  a
dormitory for auxiliary staff at the school—are older, strictly utilitarian in style and, to
sum up,  rather grim. Even so,  in everyone’s  opinion—administrative staff,  teachers,
trainee officials—the campus,  far  removed from the noise  and pollution of  the city
centre, is an agreeable place with its leafy walks, lawns and ornamental lakes, including
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a lily pond. Real care is taken to pamper the trainees, by offering them living standards
that are modern, comfortable—even luxurious—by comparison with their backgrounds
at home or at work. All those questioned admit to a slight sense of wasting their time,
but  otherwise  they  recognise  that  they  do  benefit  from  the  course,  and  more
particularly from the charms of the campus: they can rest from the heavy workload
imposed by their many responsibilities—even though many of them continue to carry
out their management duties from a distance. Indeed, a day at the school has nothing
in common with the relentless rhythm of their professional lives: classes begin at 08:30
and finish at 16:00, with a two-and-a-half-hour break for lunch, siesta included! Outside
teaching hours their time is free, so long as they stay on campus. 
16 To occupy all this free time, plans are afoot to build, between now and 2005, a bowling
alley and a swimming pool. Officially, the aim is to introduce physical exercise to the
timetable  for  the  courses;  and,  if  the  recreational  implications  of  bowling  and
swimming help to make the campus seem like paradise and thus to make the courses all
the more attractive, well, so much the better. “Healthy mind, healthy body”—as the old
saying also goes in China’s communist regime. 
 
Once a worker, now a dynamic young executive:
recruitment criteria are becoming more elitist
17 Between 1949 and the end of 2002, 65,000 trainees passed through the Shanghai Party
School, nearly 14,000 between 1949 and 1965 and over 50,000 between 1978 and 2002:
the total is arrived at by adding together the numbers of trainees as listed in tables 2, 3
and 4. Between 1966 and 1978 the school was closed. That gives us an average of 823
trainees a year before the Cultural Revolution as against 2,088 a year over the period of
the reforms. So the Shanghai Party School has trained on average two-and-a-half times
more officials under Deng and Jiang than during the Maoist period, a finding that is at
least surprising at first sight. Indeed, one would have expected a Party school to be
particularly active during the most politicised years of the regime, that is to say from
1949 until Mao’s death, and to recruit fewer trainees from 1978 onwards. The Shanghai
Party School was set up, like the CCP’s other schools, with the primary aim of training
Party officials (ganbu lunxun) 10, but it also trained other socio-professional categories
including people from outside the Party.  The exponential  growth in the number of
trainees  and  the  variation  in  their  qualifications  are  simply  the  reflection  of  the
Chinese Party-state’s political and historical evolution since its birth.
 
From 1949 to the Cultural revolution: the Party school mirrors the
regime’s fortunes
18 The  Shanghai  Party  School  opened,  from  1952  onwards,  a  section  exclusively  for
workers,  to teach them politics (Shanghai  gongren zhengzhi  xuexiao).  Those who were
enrolled for a course but who had not finished their schooling had to go back to school
before joining the Party school. Two years later, the part of the school admitting party
officials (Zhonggong Shanghai shiwei dangxiao yi bu) was separated from that admitting
workers  (Zhonggong  Shanghai  shiwei  dangxiao  er  bu).  These  measures  to  promote the
education of the working classes in an institution designed first of all for officials of the
Party-state were not at all unusual in those early years of the People’s Republic. Indeed,
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the new communist regime was striving to bring China in line with Marxist thinking
and, to that end, it had to create its working class. The tools for this purpose were the
urbanisation  and  industrialisation  policies  of  the  first  five-year  plan,  which  was
officially  launched  in  1953.  We  should  note  that  in  doing  so,  contrary  to  many
assumptions, the regime was aiming more at politicising the whole of society than at
affirming the proletarian character of the Chinese Revolution in view of its peasant
reality. The politicisation of the towns (and therefore of the workers) came after that of
the countryside (and therefore  of  the peasants).  The education of  the workers  was
approached  by  means  of training  them  in  class  consciousness  and  this  task  was
entrusted to the Party school. The 800 selected workers were able, by the end of their
course, to claim the status of Party official 11. 
19 Refocusing  our  attention  now  on  the  first  section  of  the  Party  school  (Zhonggong
Shanghai shiwei dangxiao yi bu) after the school for workers had broken away, its main
task from 1954 onwards was to train the Party’s scientific and technical officials (keji
dangyuan  ganbu).  Here  again,  we  can  see  the  new  regime’s  preoccupations,  as  it
struggled to make up for its backwardness in matters of science and technology and to
emulate the model of its big Soviet brother. Nevertheless, this section of the school was
not restricted to this category of officials. At the same time, it was organising a series of
“specialised  training  courses”  (zhuanti  xunlian  ban)  intended  for  a  wider  public.  In
winter 1952, it opened a course for the employees of a shipping company. In all, 1,040
merchant navy officers, during their stopover in Shanghai, did a three-month course at
the school 12.  Then in 1954,  with the renewal of  the thought reform campaign,  629
officials were selected for a re-education course, of whom 242 were not Party members
(fei  dang  ganbu)  13.  Aside  from  all  these  courses  intended  for  students  of  varying
backgrounds, the Shanghai Party School (and, for a period, its first section) did not
neglect its initial mission, which was to concentrate its efforts upon officials of the
administration of  the Party-state:  between 1949 and 1957,  it  trained no fewer than
7,493 officials 14. 
20 The ambivalent approach to the selection of  trainees arises also from the fact  that
there was at the start no specific instruction as to the level of officials to be admitted to
the various Party schools. At the end of 1954, a circular from the CCP in Peking summed
up the question 15. It distinguished three types of Party school, and prescribed for each
of them the trainees’ qualifications. At the top were the Marxism-Leninism Institutes,
placed  under  the  direct  control  of  the  Central  Committee  of  the  Communist  Party
(Zhonggong zhongyang zhishu malie xueyuan). These were responsible at the local level for
training Party Secretaries and their deputies, civil servants entrusted with special tasks
(zhuanyuan) and all other officials of equivalent level or above. To sum up, these Party
schools  are  set  aside  for  senior  civil  servants  and  are  called  upper  schools  (gaoji
dangxiao). Next come the middle schools (zhongji dangxiao) open to Party members at
the local level, to district secretaries and their deputies and to heads of districts (xian),
and also to all other officials of equivalent grade. Lastly, the elementary schools (chuji
dangxiao)  are  open  to  Party  members  at  xian level,  and  to  secretaries,  deputy-
secretaries  and heads  of  urban districts  as  well  as  to  all  officials  of  similar  status.
However, Shanghai was to apply the centre’s decision only three years later, on
February 8th 1957, when the two sections of the school were reunited under this new
name: the Elementary School of the Committee of the Communist Party of Shanghai
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(Zhonggong Shanghai shiwei chuji dangxiao), which fell, as the name indicated, into the
third category.
21 But the school had only just clarified the task allotted to it when it was confronted with
a serious crisis. In April 1957, the rectification campaign broadened, with the Hundred
Flowers Movement, into a national mass movement. Mao designated the officials of the
Party as  targets  and wished them to be subjected to the “criticism of  the masses”.
Through them, the Party schools were also affected by the shake-up within the Party
and,  in  Shanghai,  the  Elementary  School  ceased  all  activity  from  June  13th1957
onwards. It did not open its doors again until February 1958. 
22 In February 1959,  the Elementary School merged with a middle school,  thus higher
ranked than itself, and took the name it had adopted when first set up in 1949—the
school  of  the  Committee  of  the  Communist  Party  of  Shanghai  (Zhonggong  Shanghai
shiwei dangxiao)—a name that has remained unchanged ever since. The merger raised
the establishment to the level of middle school; accordingly, the category of trainees
was  also  raised.  From  then  on,  its  role  was  to  train  officials  at  the  level  of  (the)
department (chu): or at equivalent levels in the organisations of the Party and the state,
or within companies and enterprises, and as much at the level of the city (shi) and the
urban  districts as  of  the  district.  After  three  changes  of  name  and  ten  years  of
indiscriminate  recruitment  (workers,  sailors,  civil  servants  without  Party  affiliation
and Party officials), the Shanghai School had recovered its original name and readopted
its initial task. Thus 1959 gave it a new start—but the political events of the following
decade were once again to hinder its activities.
23 In 1962,  Mao launched a second shake-up of  the Party:  this  was the Movement for
Socialist Education, which was in fact the prelude to the Cultural Revolution. Over the
following two years, local officials were subjected to widespread purges. On November
21st 1963, 2,000 officials were sent to the countryside after only ten days’ attendance at
the school! In 1964, the school organised only one training course; and, in January 1965,
all those who were finishing their courses were also sent down to the countryside with
the school’s Deputy Director 16. The Cultural Revolution, which started in earnest that
same year,  was  to  take an extreme turn in  Shanghai  with the fall  of  its  municipal
government in December 1966. Then the city became a stronghold for the Gang of Four
during the 1970s 17. The Shanghai Party School, which had ceased all activity from 1965,
was officially closed on February 3rd 1969 and was to stay closed for the next ten years.
24 Between 1959 and 1964, it had organised courses for 5,465 officials 18, which in relation
to the 7,493 trainees of the earlier period (1949 to 1957) represents a yearly average
that is comparable, even slightly higher: 832 in the first phase as against 910 in the
second. Had it not been for the Cultural Revolution, the numbers of trainees would
have been higher still. Twice over, in 1958 and from 1965 onwards, the school suffered
the consequences of ideological and bureaucratic clashes, factional struggles that split
the Party apparatus. Because of its status as Party school and, above all, because of its
role, which was to train Party officials, the school’s fate was intimately linked with that
of the Chinese Party-state and reflected its ups and downs. Thus, throughout the 1950s,
at a time when the new regime was in the process of becoming institutionalised 19, the
mission entrusted to the Shanghai Party School was not yet very well defined. Then,
during  the  following  decade,  the  decline  of  the  Party-state  apparatus  impeded the
school’s performance and eventually brought about its closure.
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1978 to the present day: the Party school, protagonist of the
reforms 
25 Mao died in September 1976. The following month, the Shanghai Gang of Four, led by
Jiang  Qing,  were  arrested.  The  leading  officials  of  the  city  administration  had  to
confront a similar situation to that of 1949: once it had been liberated from the radicals’
grasp, the city no longer had enough officials to cope with the administration. On one
hand, many of those trained during the 1960s had been sent to the countryside and, on
the other,  since  the  arrest  of  the  Gang of  Four,  the  municipal  apparatus  had been
subjected to purges aimed at eliminating all its former partisans: nearly one-third of
the officials were affected 20. Thus, in November 1977 the question arose of reopening
the Party school so that it could quickly train new officials. This was done on April 11th
1978. 
26 This time, however, the school was no longer restricted to officials at the level of the
department as had been specified at the time when its status had last been changed in
1959. It also aimed at training officers of higher grades, though precise criteria were
not set. In August 1981, a new arrangement was reached: each year, the school had to
devote  its  second  semester  to  “the  training  of  young  elite  officials”  (peixun  youxiu
zhongqingnian ganbu) to turn them into the leading figures of the coming era. Thus, the
school  took  a  decisive  turn,  opening  its  doors  now  to  officials  with  different
qualifications, being both younger and better educated, hence the term “elite” (youxiu).
Zhongqingnian, referred to people aged between 34 and 44. At the end of their course,
these trainees were to be promoted to the upper grades to replace the older generation,
that is to say, officials over 60 who were retiring in increasing numbers 21. In March of
the following year, the Shanghai School adopted the policy of the “four mores” (si hua),
the word “more” being applied to the qualities of the officials they aimed to turn out:
more revolutionary, (geminghua), more youth (nianqinghua), more cultivated (zhishihua)
and more specialised (zhuanyehua). While the first criterion is largely rhetorical, the
three others imply an increasingly elitist recruitment and training policy. In renewing
its officials, Shanghai wanted to show Peking not only that it was definitively moving
away from its radical past but also that it was preparing its leaders fully to comprehend
the reform process when its own turn should come.
27 For its part, the Central Committee of the CCP decided, in March 1983, that provincial
leaders would have to do a course at the Central Party School 22. In sending them to
Peking,  to  the  most  prestigious  of  all  the  Party  schools,  the  Chinese  leaders  were
showing that they were intent on providing the best possible training for top provincial
civil servants.  Moreover,  the  Central  Committee  published  a  circular  aimed  at
standardising  the  reforms  within  Party  schools  across  the  country.  This  document
indicates that the Party schools must recruit from among officials at the level of the
department (chu) and the bureau ( ju);  their  task was to  train those entrusted with
political work (zhengzhi ganbu) and theoretical work (lilun ganbu); at the same time, they
had to organise specialised catching up classes (zhuanxiu ke) 23. This last point was in
fact the most important, as it gave the local Party organisations and their schools a free
hand to adapt their courses according to their own needs. 
28 February  1984  marked a  new turning  point  in  the  history  of the  Shanghai  School.
During a visit by Deng Xiaoping and Wang Zhen, who was at that time Director of the
Central  Party  School,  Wang  praised  the  quality  of  the  training  that  officials  were
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receiving in Shanghai and suggested to Deng that, at the end of their courses, they
should be deployed throughout China. This little suggestion was enough to raise the
Shanghai School to the status of a national school, a model, in fact, to be followed, and
it raised the school’s prestige above that of the other provincial Party schools.
 
Table 2: Courses at the shanghai Party school, 1978-1998
Source: Idem table 1
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Table 3: Courses at the Shanghai Administration Institute, 1985-1999
Source: Idem table 1
29 At that time, as the reforms took hold along with the new forms of management that
they required, Chinese leaders became aware that the new elites, at local and national
level, should have not merely political skills—which, broadly speaking, can be summed
up as sticking to the Party line—but also skills in public administration. For this reason,
in accordance with the decision by the Central Department of Organisation published
in October 1983 24,  the Shanghai Municipal administration set up its Administration
Institute for Officials (Shanghai  shi  xingzheng guanli  ganbu xueyuan)  which became, in
April 1989, the Shanghai Administration Institute (Shanghai xingzheng xueyuan). Straight
after  it  was  founded,  it  was  integrated into  the  Shanghai  Party  School,  sharing  its
premises as well as its management and administrative staff. Inscriptions were located
on each side of the entrance gate: Shanghai xingzheng xueyuan, on one side, and Shanghai
shiwei dangxiao,  on the other: “two names for a single school” (liang kuai paizi,  yi tao
banzi). But this situation was not unique to Shanghai: it became the rule in all local
areas that had an administration institute for it to be housed with the Party school as a
single establishment. The only remaining exception was in Peking where the Central
Party  School  (Zhonggong  zhongyang  dangxiao)  is  totally  separate  from  the  National
Institute of Administration (Guojia xingzheng xueyuan). 
30 The role of the Institute of Administration in Shanghai (see Table 3) consists in training
officials responsible for public administration and, more widely, the officials of the city
administration (peixun Shanghai shi xingzheng guanli ganbu he gongwuyuan). It extends to
recruiting young officials of the “democratic parties” and organising special training
courses for them (minzhu dangpai zhongqingnian ganbu peixun ban). It must also recruit
and train officials from other provinces, in particular Yunnan and Xinjiang, because of
their  privileged relationships  with the  Shanghai  city  administration.  These  officials
attend courses specially prepared for them (wai sheng shi xingzheng guanli ganbu peixun
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ban) and are ostracised to some extent, in the canteen and around the campus, by their
Shanghai colleagues, who consider the visitors as country bumpkins (hen tu). By putting
in  place  its  own  training  courses  oriented  towards  public  administration  and
establishing its own trainee years whose recruitment extends beyond Party officials,
the Administration Institute wishes to be separate from the Party school and to be
identified as a school with a professional purpose, one beyond political considerations
and regional splits. It also seeks to open itself to the outside world by inviting lecturers
from  abroad  and  developing  exchange  programmes  with  European  and  American
administration institutes, among them the French École Nationale d’Administration (ENA).
The  Shanghai  Institute  of  Administration  is  therefore  the  local  administration’s
instrument of reform 25. 
31 Moreover, the policy of reform and openness has made Chinese leaders aware that it is
just  as  important  to  train  the  officials  who  find  themselves  running  the  state
enterprises. For this reason, ever since 1990, the school has been organising training
courses specially tailored for administration and Party officials in enterprise groupings
(qiye jituan dangzheng ganbu ban). Between 1990 and 2002, the school turned out nearly
4,000 trainees in this category. These courses were intended for officials in the big state
groupings, particular the enterprises in Shanghai and its surrounding region, such as
Baoshan.
32 Even when it comes to selecting its trainees, the Shanghai Party School works in close
collaboration with the Shanghai City Bureau of Human Resources (Shanghai shi renshi ju)
since this is the office that has all the career data, not just those of Party officials but also of
all the civil servants employed by the local Party-state apparatus. The Human Resources
Bureau draws up the list of officials and civil servants whose turn it is to do a course at the
Party school; a candidate is chosen either by virtue of his or her personal record or because
the Bureau is carrying out the directives of the Party’s local committee which decides to
organise specific training courses according to current circumstances—for instance, on the
occasion of China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation or to study the political
slogans currently on the agenda, such as the Theory of the Three Representations. But it can
happen that some administrations decide for themselves to call on the Party school and
its Administration Institute to organise a one-off course adapted to its needs.
33 Thus, the Shanghai Party School, responding to an initiative dictated by the need to
make  up  the  shortage  of  officials—therefore  quantitative  in  kind—has  undertaken
reforms  of  a  more  qualitative  kind;  it  has  taken  on  the  role  of  training  the  new
leadership elite,  made up of  younger and more competent officials  within both the
Party-state apparatus and the economic structures that it directly manages. But have
these reforms favoured the modernisation of the Shanghai Municipal administration?
34 Since the school reopened in 1978, the combination of measures described above has
been aimed at redefining and making more professional the job of Party official or civil
servant.  From  this  point  of  view,  one  may  effectively  speak  of  the  Shanghai
administration going through a form of modernisation. On the other hand, the fact of
having within one single entity the Party school and the Administration Institute is
highly significant. If the reforms introduced at the local level, in a city that sees itself as
China’s economic and financial capital as well as its shop window, are not aimed at a
separation—at  least  relative—between state  administrative  structures  and the Party
apparatus, then how can this be an objective at the national level? The reforms within
this Party school reflect the concerns and the limitations of the political reforms as a
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whole:  the  modernisation  of  the  administration,  and  the  professionalisation  of
management staff are accepted facts and recognised norms, but only within the Party-
state and under its control: these remain omnipresent. One might conclude that this
requirement restricts the reach of any reform. Conversely, however, bearing in mind
that the leadership persists in holding onto structures that are evolving, sometimes
quite considerably, is it not exposing itself to unwanted change that, through force of
circumstances, might take effect from within? 
35 The last reform to affect the trainees, adopted on May 5th 1990, shows what is at stake
in this two-sided reality. The local authorities decided then that all officials at bureau
level (ju) must return for a course at the Party school every three to five years 26; this
would help them to bring their knowledge up to date and to remain in step with the
progress of  the reforms.  So here,  reaffirmed,  is  the school’s  concern—following the
creation of  its  Administration Institute—to continue working towards making Party
officials more professional. It turned out, however, that this new rule had another use,
that of assuring the Party school that it would always have trainees within its walls,
which offers a double advantage. Firstly, the school is guaranteed a continuous supply
of funds, since the danwei have a duty to pay the training expenses (xuefei) of their
employees,  who  are  themselves  obliged  to  follow  the  courses;  these  expenses  are
calculated in thousands of yuan. Thus, a full-time course lasting three months costs
about 6,000 yuan per head.  Secondly,  this  measure enables  the regime regularly to
remind its officials of the Party line and to exert its power directly. It may punish them
(why?) by holding back promotion or even by demoting them—though this is rare; or it
may reward them with a promotion at the end of the training course. To sum up, the
Chinese Party-state takes a payoff from the principles of its  own structure so as to
maintain its domination over its leading officials.
 
Classes in the spirit of the times
36 Even though the Shanghai Party School is wielded like an instrument by the Chinese
communist regime, which uses it to control its personnel, it is above all, as its name
indicates, a school: that is to say, “an establishment in which collective education is
offered” 27.  And,  effectively,  the main activity of  the officials  enrolled in a training
course is to follow the classes that make up the main part of the timetable. 
37 If the trainees have evolved both quantitatively and qualitatively, the same is true of
the courses. They have grown in number: before the Cultural Revolution there were
five types of course (Table 1), whereas since 1979 there have been 16, of which ten are
offered by the Party school (Table 2), and six by the Administration Institute (Table 3).
Aside from the different names given to these courses, their programmes of study, that
is to say, the number of classes and the subjects taught, do not vary much from one
course to another over a given period. Between 1949 and 1965, for example, the officials
taking part in the “specialised training course” followed more or less the same course
syllabus  as  did  those  enrolled for  the  “theoretical  course”.  On the other  hand,  the
content of the “training course” during the period 1949 to 1956 is no longer anything
like that of the “training course” today. So the content of the courses evolves with
time; and in this respect they reflect—just like the qualifications of the trainees, but
perhaps  even  more  obviously—the  upheavals  that  the  People’s  Republic  has  lived
through since 1949 and still more since 1979. 
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 From Marxism…
38 The classes taught at the Shanghai Party School before the Cultural Revolution can be
arranged within two categories: courses with a practical purpose, in one, and courses of
a theoretical nature, in the other. A course’s syllabus may be composed of a single kind
of class or of two kinds. Between 1949 and 1965, 6,392 trainees took practical classes
during their courses. By “laying end to end” the duration of the courses, this was a total
49 months of training, that is to say, more than four years. For this same period, 12,078
trainees qualified for theoretical classes during their courses and between them spent
249 months in training, more than twenty years 28. Admittedly, this type of calculation,
because of the lack of precise data on the number of hours spent in each class, must be
used with caution. Nevertheless, it does give some indication of the place occupied by
these two kinds of classes in course syllabuses before the Cultural Revolution. We may
thus retain the fact that, between 1949 and 1965, the theoretical classes drew twice as
many trainees as the practical classes for a training duration five times as long!
 
Table 4: Number of trainees, 1999-2002
Source: Idem table 1
39 The practical classes are those that have an immediate application, because they have a
bearing either on questions of public administration or on the introduction of specific
policies. From 1949 until the school was closed, 4,985 trainees took classes on the new
administration of the City administration, for a total duration of nearly four years. In
1953, with the launch of the first five-year plan, 1,407 trainees, whose training totalled
three months, took classes specifically on the introduction of planning. 
40 The courses of a more theoretical kind covered three main areas of study: the Chinese
Communist Party, socialism and the reading of texts. In the early classes on the CCP
(7,523 trainees, 112 months) the teaching concentrated on the history of the Party since
its foundation, and on extolling the glories of the “Liberation”. From 1953 onwards,
these classes laid more stress on the Party line and its objectives as the 1950s were a
time when a new economic strategy was being adopted. But from 1961 onwards, at a
time when the tensions between Mao and the Party were more and more visible and
when  China  had  taken  stock  of  the  social  and  economic  policies  applied  over  the
previous  decade,  trainees  were  supposed  to  think  about  “building”  the  Party.  The
classes  on  socialism  (3,605  trainees,  over seven  years)  were  devoted  to  the  basic
principles of Marxist philosophy and the theories of socialism. We come lastly to the
study of texts (950 trainees, four years), which were related either to contemporary
political events, such as the Three Antis (Sanfan) studied in 1952 or to written accounts
of Party meetings. However, starting in 1960, the Party school mainly had its students
reading extracts from the selected works of Mao, which says a lot about the political
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context  of  the  time.  In  consequence,  the  classes  on  the  Chinese  Communist  Party
occupied the predominant place, which after all is quite normal for a Party school.
 
…to international finance
41 Shortly after it reopened, at a time when China was committing itself to the path of
reform, the classes at the Party school began a smooth transition. For the first courses,
the works of Marx were on the syllabus, in equal place with those of Mao; little by little
they  were  edged  aside,  making  way  for  new  subjects  that  were  progressively
introduced over the 1990s 29. But the Party school waited until the Fifteenth Congress of
the CCP in 1997 to definitively give up the study of  Marxism and to introduce the
theories of Deng. 
42 The teaching of new subjects is in part taken on by the Administration Institute, which,
as  we  have  seen  earlier,  is  responsible  for  all  classes  relating  specifically  to
administrative  science  and  its  technical  aspects.  All  new  teaching  not  directly
concerned with questions of public administration—that is, most of it—falls to the Party
school. Subjects include law, management, human resources, economy and finance, and
also international relations. Each of these new subjects is approached by way of topics
as  numerous  as  they  are  varied.  They  extend  from  the  very  general  to  the  very
particular, so as to cover the vast range of upheavals set in train by the reform policy
and to help officials grasp these totally new situations. 
43 Our survey, based on shared observation, reveals that classes on generalised topics,
such as “the socialist market economy” or “the senior executive in the twenty-first
century”,  mostly  given by Party  school  lecturers,  are  regarded as  rather  boring by
students. The most diligent among them take a few notes, but with little conviction;
some  others,  Party  officials  though  they  are,  openly  read  newspapers—and  not
necessarily the People’s  Daily;  still  worse, others play games on their mobile phones,
which go beep-beep every time they win or lose; or they simply fall asleep at the back of
the class, and snore. By contrast, classes based on case studies are what trainees most
appreciate. Indeed, when a concrete question is to be studied, in its technical, financial
or  legal  aspects  (for  example,  “public  construction  and the  property  market”),  the
school frequently brings in an outside specialist, to whom it disburses a few hundred
yuan in payment for two-and-a-half hours in the classroom. Not only does the specialist
speak to his fellow-officials without that excessively professorial tone that the school’s
own lecturers adopt, he can share his own experience with them and discuss solutions
they can apply to the problems they will have to face. Thus it was that a senior official
of the Shanghai Municipal Administration found himself facing his opposite numbers
from  one  of  Shanghai’s  neighbouring  provinces,  listing  in  great  detail  the  various
redundancy schemes that the Municipal Administration was introducing following the
closure of state enterprises. As it happened, the conclusion that the trainees drew from
this session—highly instructive—was that the government of their province would not
be able to apply the Shanghai solutions, for the very good reason that it was not as rich
as Shanghai…
44 However, it is not just the content of the classes that has evolved. Since the start of the
1990s, the school has undertaken to modernise its teaching methods. To this end, it
sent its teaching staff on various training courses, not only to teach them how to give
PowerPoint presentations but also so that they could polish up their own competence
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in their specialised fields. They are also asked not to content themselves with speaking
throughout their classes from the platform at the front of the room, as they had always
done before, but to encourage debate, either by prompting trainees to ask questions, or
by dividing the class into small groups so they could debate among themselves. At the
end of each course, the trainees are handed round a questionnaire that they must fill in
anonymously, and in which they must award a mark to each lecturer. Those lecturers
who  accumulate  a  certain  number  of  bad  marks  are  provisionally  suspended  from
teaching while they undergo re-training. 
45 The trainees themselves are put to the test in this new way of teaching. They can no
longer be content with a passive act of attendance; they must take an active part in
debates, hand in written work and take exams at the end of the course. Again, they
have a strong interest in winning good marks, in order not to hold back their careers.
While the main part of the course syllabus consists of lectures and seminars, there are
several  variations  according  to  the  age-groups  of  the  trainees.  The  school  divides
trainees among three age-groups: junior officials (qing qingnian ganbu) aged between 24
and  34,  young  officials  (zhong  qingnian ganbu)  from  34  to  44,  and  lastly  the  senior
officials  aged  44  and  above.  Whereas  this  last  category  attends  only  lectures  and
seminars, the other two do fieldwork. The courses for the juniors last for eight months.
They spend the first three within the People’s Liberation Army then the next three
working the land in the countryside; only the last two months are devoted to study.
The  officials  aged  from  34  to  44  do  a  three-month  course  ending  with  a  week  of
fieldwork that is spent visiting other local administrations or—and this is a frequent
alternative—attending classes at the Shenzhen Party School. Indeed, even though the
Shanghai School enjoys its status as a model provincial Party school, it does recognise
that the Shenzhen School has plenty to teach it, in particular because the big Special
Economic Zone in the south entered the reform era well before Shanghai. 
46 Moreover, the qualifications of the teachers at the school have also evolved. Before
1979, they were all theoreticians straight from the Party (dangnei lilun laoshi) whereas,
since  the  reforms,  the  school  has  tried  to  recruit  more  among  young  university
graduates at a level equivalent to a master’s degree or, better still, a doctorate: such
recruits  are  not  easy  to  find.  Indeed,  almost  all  such  graduates,  on  finishing  their
studies, aspire to a well-paid job in the economic sphere and the private sector. To
those  preferring  to  stay  in  the  teaching  milieu,  numerous  higher  education
establishments are open.  The latter  are in general  more prestigious than the Party
schools or the administration institutes (with the exception of the Central Party School
and the Administration Institute in Peking, both enjoying a special aura that confers
unequalled status)  and can offer posts at  a relatively comfortable level  of  pay with
significant advantages. As a result, the teachers recruited by the Party schools at the
local level are generally those who have not been able to find posts elsewhere. 
47 However, there are some exceptions; and at the Shanghai Party School one of these is
Wang Zhiping, who is regarded as a model. The latter joined the teaching staff of the
school in 2000 to become economics professor, at a time when he was at the peak of his
career, with the job of Director General of a big textile company and earning a salary of
about 10,000 yuan a month. Wang took a master’s degree and a doctorate from Jiaotong
University, going on to hold various posts in business and the administration that took
him several times to America; later on, he stayed there as a guest researcher. He is the
only teacher in the school who has behind him twenty years’ experience of the world of
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work—and this makes itself felt both in the content of his classes and in his teaching
style. Although he now earns “only” 3,000 yuan monthly, he does not regret having
made this career choice; it gives him job security, as well as a network of connections,
and above all the free time to teach elsewhere, which includes MBA courses that pay
between 500 and 1,000 yuan for a day’s teaching. The work he does on the side enables
Wang to double, even to treble, his monthly earnings…
48 The reform policy has thus had two important consequences. For one thing, the topics
dealt  with  in  the  classes  have  been adapted to  bring  them into  line  with  the  new
Chinese realities that the officials will have to confront; and, for another, the spirit of
emulation, or even competition, has invigorated the teaching staff and the trainees.
Admittedly,  these changes help to distance the Shanghai Party School from what it
started out to be, namely, a political school in which trainees were inculcated with a
few notions of Marxism and much propaganda. Instead, they are gradually turning it
into  a  modern  institute  of  public  administration,  where  the  teaching  has  a  direct
application to the management of the city. From this point of view, one may say (in
response to the question asked about the ambivalence of the changing content of the
classes)  that  the  Shanghai  Party  School  is  leaning  towards  making  politics  more
professional. But there are limits.
49 Indeed, political propaganda is still omnipresent in all classes, even those which on the
face of it concern only the technical aspects of administration. What is more, classes of
a more political nature have not completely disappeared from the timetable, although
they also have been spiced up to suit more modern tastes. This means that the political
norms have changed as well. Control is still there. It is exerted by means of techniques
that have developed, if not in step and in agreement with society, then at least in the
direction of an overall change desired by the regime: Marx and Mao have been replaced
by Deng who himself has given way to Jiang Zemin. It is true that political classes do
not fill so much space today; of the nine classes a week that normally make up a full-
time course, two on average are clearly designed as propaganda. And in this respect,
the  Shanghai  School  is  still  unmistakeably  the  Party  school.  Moreover,  while  the
trainees are encouraged to express themselves in written homework and to take part in
debates, they must not stray outside the Party line. Thus, to a question that was used as
the title for an essay, “What makes a good senior official?”, if a trainee had replied, “a
certain level of education” or “first and foremost, a sense of public welfare”, the essay
would have been marked down to zero 30. The good senior official is first and last the
one who follows the line of the Chinese Communist Party.
 
The many faces of the Party school
50 What is a Party school in present-day China? Our study has shown that it is valued
more for the contacts (guanxi) that students can make there than for the teaching it
offers. But we are also keen to show that the story of the Shanghai Party School has
gone hand in hand with that of the Chinese communist regime. In a way, the school
embodies the pulse of the Party-state. It is not just an indicator of its evolution but also
a vital organ of its apparatus.
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The pulse of the Chinese communist regime
51 During that period when the regime’s institutions were being formed, the qualifications
of the school’s recruits as well as the subjects it taught reflected the priorities of the
Party-state.  When the  latter  found itself  weakened by  the  violence  of  the  political
campaigns and factional struggles of the Hundred Flowers Movement, and then by the
Cultural Revolution, the Shanghai Party School—along with the various Party schools
across the country—had to close down. And, since it reopened in 1978, the building of a
larger and more modern campus, and the changes brought about in the recruitment of
trainees and teachers, as well as the content of the courses and the teaching methods,
may be taken as so many signs attesting to the modernisation of the school in step with
that of the country.
52 However, the Shanghai Party School is much more than the mirror of the communist
regime. Because a change of post is generally preceded by a training course, this school,
like all the other Party schools, plays its part in the circulation of the Party-state’s elite,
that is to say, its senior executives, the very people who manage and direct the course
of the reforms. The training course, because it enables senior executives to take stock
of selected and specific questions relating to the reforms, can be useful for them in the
performance of their duties and helps to professionalise their jobs. 
 
An instrument in the service of the Party-state
53 But  why  should  this  further  training be  restricted  to  the  Party  schools  and  the
administration institutes attached to them? After all, would they not suit structures
other than those of the Party, such as universities and institutions for higher education
and vocational training? The latter, in Shanghai as in other great Chinese cities, are
offering an increasing number of complementary training programmes with diplomas
thrown in,  designed  for  people  already  in  the  employment  market  but  wanting  to
resume their studies to reach a better understanding of this transition period. It is true
that,  for the time being,  these programmes consist  mainly of  courses in languages,
accountancy and management, or MBA courses—some of which, like that of the China
Europe International Business School (CEIBS) are beginning to acquire some prestige—
and  as  such  do  not  directly  address  the  needs  of  senior  executives  in  the
administration.  For  a  start,  local  government  (administration  and  human  resource
offices)  would  have  to  reach  agreement  with  institutions  of  higher  education  on
creating further training programmes specially tailored for working civil servants. By
shifting in this way the training of Party-state officials towards educational structures
outside  those  of  the  Party,  Chinese  leaders  would  be  showing  a  real  will  to
professionalise the executives. But that would require the Party-state to accept the loss
of some small amount of control over its own life blood.
54 At the end of the 1990s, the Shanghai Normal University did set up a course of study in
“administrative science” aimed at students who wished to study for a career in the
administration. This innovation might have constituted an advance towards separating
the career of state civil servant from that of Party official, which would have given full
professionalism  to  the  status  of  both.  But  on  closer  examination,  the  training  is
discovered to have been put in place on the initiative of the Shanghai Party School: it
was seeking thus to renew its elite by selecting, at the end of the programme, the best
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students in order to add them to its own training group of junior officials aged 24 to 34.
Besides,  some of  the  College’s  courses  are  held  in  the  Party  school.  So  there  is  no
question of separating the training—and thus the duties—of state civil servants from
that of Party officials, nor is there any question either of separating the structures of
the state administration from the Party apparatus.  Even Shenzhen,  although it  had
promised reforms to its administration 31, did not plan to go so far, despite what some
of its more optimistic spirits were thinking 32. When one considers that the Shenzhen
Party School, which today is merged with its Administration Institute, will shortly be
moving to a bigger campus while continuing to house the Administration Institute—
and all this despite the restructuring of its own administration—one cannot envisage
any possible separation between the Party and the state in a city that, like Shanghai but
in different respects—is at the cutting edge of the economic reforms. For the separation
to  be  effective,  it  would  have  to  separate  the  training  of  civil  servants  in  the
administration from that of officials in the Party. And, as has already been emphasised,
the courses given in the Party schools are also designed to ensure regular control over
the officials’ level of political instruction and to make sure that its elite continues to
think and act in step with the Party line. Because they help to maintain the dominance
of the Party-state in China, the Party schools are a vital mechanism in perpetuating the
regime.
 
…or an agent for change?
55 However,  the relationship between the Party-state and its  schools is  not a one-way
transaction, in which the former uses the latter as an instrument in the exercise of its
power. It is common knowledge that the Central Party School organises discussions and
debates that are relatively open as to the line to be adopted by the Party and the way in
which the reforms should be carried forward. In this context, the Central Party School
is rated as a think tank in the network of Peking’s top advisers even though there are
doubts as to its real influence over the policies implemented 33. What matters is that it
takes  part  in  one  way  or  another  in  the  decision-making  process,  and reflects  the
evolution of the Party-state while not actually reforming it. To a lesser extent, the local
Party schools are also the think tanks of the local authorities, advising them on more
contextual aspects of introducing and managing the reforms and, in doing so, they also
take part in redefining the role of the Party-state in the reforms. 
56 So there are two views of reality and two approaches still  to the question of what
developments may be possible. For the time being, while the Party schools are not the
agents of radical change, they do nevertheless appear to be the agents of some lesser
form of change in a scheme that is more social and cultural than political; thus, they
help to perpetuate a system of domination. The changes, now and always, are inspired
pragmatism; and they are nothing less than a new attempt to legitimise the old system.
From Senior Official to Top Civil Servant
China Perspectives, 46 | march-april 2003
19
NOTES
1.  This study, the result of a fifteen-month stay in Shanghai, was made possible thanks to the
financial  support  of,  firstly,  the  French  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  which  awarded  me  the
Lavoisier  Scholarship  (2000-2001)  and,  secondly,  the  Centre  d’études  français  sur  la  Chine
contemporaine  (CEFC)  in  Hong  Kong  where  I  am  grant-holder  (2001-2003).  I  should  like  to
express here my heartfelt gratitude to those who have supported my candidacy for both these
grants of financial help
2.  Andrew Nathan and Bruce Gilley, China’s New Rulers: The Secret Files, Granta Books, London,
2002. The Chinese-language book on which they based their work is by a Chinese national who is
particularly well  informed about the internal affairs of the Party and who has had access to
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